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REMOVING THE “SILENCER”: COVERAGE 
AND PROTECTION OF PHYSICIAN SPEECH 
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
RYAN T. WEISS† 
ABSTRACT 
  The physician–patient relationship rests on a bedrock of trust. 
Without trust, patients—and for that matter, physicians—are less 
willing to divulge information critical to providing accurate medical 
diagnoses and treatments. The state of Florida seemingly ignored this 
when its legislature, with support from the National Rifle Association 
and other pro-gun advocates, enacted the Firearm Owners Privacy 
Act (FOPA), a statute that restricts physicians from questioning their 
patients about firearm ownership. In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of 
Florida, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
held that FOPA did not regulate physician speech but, instead, 
regulated physician conduct. As such, the law was exempted from 
First Amendment scrutiny. But almost one year to the day after 
publishing its first Wollschlaeger opinion, the Eleventh Circuit sua 
sponte vacated its original opinion and substituted in its place a brand 
new opinion—one holding that FOPA was subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny, but nonetheless passed constitutional muster. 
  This Note uses the diverging Wollschlaeger opinions as a vehicle 
to analyze the First Amendment’s coverage and protection of 
physician speech. Specifically, it argues that an uninhibited line of 
communication is required to protect the trust necessary for an 
effective physician–patient relationship. This logical underpinning 
leads to the conclusion that the First Amendment presumptively 
covers physician speech and, furthermore, that physician speech 
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny—a level of scrutiny that 
FOPA cannot meet. 
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The right of the doctor to advise his patients according to his 
best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as 
to need no extended discussion. 
 – U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice William O. Douglas,  
    Poe v. Ullman1 
INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment serves as a shield against government 
suppression of speech2 and does not cease to defend a physician-
speaker when he or she speaks in a professional capacity.3 In fact, the 
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that professional speech in 
many contexts enjoys the strongest protection the Constitution 
provides.4 But this concept—protected professional speech—contrasts 
sharply with the common understanding that states “have broad 
power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating 
the practice of professions.”5 Thus, no constitutional issue arises when 
physicians’ speech rights are “implicated but only as part of the 
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by 
the State.”6 These seemingly irreconcilable concepts have led to great 
confusion regarding the regulation of speech in a professional 
relationship. Because this dichotomy has gone largely unaddressed by 
 
 1. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 2. See Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the 
Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 232 (1994) (recognizing that the 
First Amendment “safeguards individuals’ thought processes and expression against 
government suppression”).  
 3. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465, 1473 (D. Colo. 
1988) (identifying a “physician’s First Amendment right to disseminate necessary medical 
information to patients”).  
 4. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995) (asserting that in certain 
situations, attorney speech receives the “strongest protection our Constitution has to offer”). 
The First Amendment’s protective shield is not limited to professional speech—it also extends 
to speech utilized to engage in economic activity. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 
(1945) (asserting that the safeguards of the First Amendment are still applicable when the 
speech involves business or economic transactions); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770–73 (1976) (stating that commercial speech 
receives First Amendment protection). 
 5. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).  
 6. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(citations omitted). 
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the Supreme Court,7 the relationship between physician speech and 
the First Amendment remains nascent and unclear.8 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed this 
doctrinal confusion. In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida,9 the 
Eleventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of a Florida statute 
that restricts healthcare practitioners and facilities from inquiring into 
a patient’s ownership or possession of firearms and ammunition.10 
Specifically, Florida’s Firearm Owners Privacy Act (FOPA) prohibits 
physicians from inquiring about patients’ possession of firearms and 
ammunition,11 keeping records regarding patients’ possession of 
firearms and ammunition,12 and harassing13 or discriminating against14 
patients on the basis of firearm and ammunition possession. 
Plaintiffs15 alleged that FOPA openly discriminates based on the 
viewpoint of physicians’ speech16 and thus violated the First 
Amendment.17 Originally, the Eleventh Circuit held that FOPA was 
not subject to any level of heightened scrutiny because it regulated 
conduct instead of speech.18 But, in a surprising turn of events, the 
Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated its original opinion and held 
 
 7. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the 
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 834 (1999) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court and lower courts have rarely addressed the First Amendment contours of a professional’s 
freedom to speak to a client.”).  
 8. See Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 570 (4th Cir. 2013) (deciding not 
to outline specific margins of the professional speech doctrine); see also Jennifer M. Keighley, 
Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled 
Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2368 (2013) (“The relationship between the First 
Amendment and physicians’ professional speech unfortunately remains undeveloped and 
unclear.”); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 944 (referencing the “obscure and 
controversial” relationship between the First Amendment and regulating professional physician 
speech). 
 9. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015).   
 10. Id. at 869; see also FLA. STAT. § 790.338 (2014) (codifying Florida’s Firearm Owners 
Privacy Act). 
 11. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2).  
 12. Id. § 790.338(1).  
 13. Id. § 790.338(6).  
 14. Id. § 790.338(5).  
 15. Plaintiffs included various Florida physicians and interest groups. Wollschlaeger, 797 
F.3d at 868. 
 16. Id. at 871. 
 17. Plaintiffs also challenged that FOPA was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 878–83. 
Although these claims may have been meritorious, they are not discussed in this Note.   
 18. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1225 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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instead that FOPA regulated speech.19 As a result, answering a second 
question became necessary: Did FOPA pass heightened scrutiny?20 
After emphasizing the state’s strong interest in regulating physician 
speech “for the protection of the public,”21 the Eleventh Circuit held 
that FOPA passed constitutional muster.22 This interpretation, 
however, was not unanimous—Judge Charles R. Wilson penned a 
fiery dissent, claiming that FOPA “significantly infringes upon [the 
First Amendment] right . . . and cannot pass constitutional muster.”23 
This Note uses the Wollschlaeger decision as a lens through 
which to examine the coverage and protection of physician speech 
under the First Amendment. It argues that physician speech 
presumptively falls within the First Amendment’s boundaries because 
an uninhibited line of communication is necessary to a physician–
patient relationship founded on trust. Furthermore, as restricting 
physician speech on discrete topics is necessarily content based, these 
regulatory schemes must receive at least intermediate scrutiny. 
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I sets the stage by 
providing a brief history of FOPA, the First Amendment, and 
governmental regulation of physicians. Part II argues that physician 
speech is “covered” by the First Amendment and that the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision to analyze FOPA under heightened scrutiny was 
correct—but for the wrong reasons. Having shown that the First 
Amendment cannot be avoided, Part III explains why and when 
regulations that restrict physician speech should be subjected to 
intermediate scrutiny. In doing so, Part III posits that FOPA violates 
the First Amendment. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY 
Grasping the concept of physician speech through the lens of 
Wollschlaeger requires reviewing certain background principles. Part 
A chronicles both FOPA’s infancy and the Wollschlaeger case. Part B 
expatiates on freedom of speech and provides a broad overview of 
 
 19. Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 886. During final revisions to this Note, the Eleventh 
Circuit sua sponte vacated and replaced its July 2015 opinion as well. Wollschlaeger v. Governor 
of Fla., No. 12-14009, 2015 WL 8639875 (11th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015). Due to publication deadlines, 
this Note does not take that opinion into account. 
 20. See Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 886 (proceeding to the scrutiny question only after 
holding that FOPA implicates speech).  
 21. Id. at 889.  
 22. Id. at 900.  
 23. Id. at 902 (Wilson, J., dissenting).  
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the First Amendment. Finally, Part C describes the government’s 
ability to regulate the medical field. 
A. FOPA’s Impetus and Infancy 
1. “A miffed mother, a perturbed pediatrician, a fervent gun-rights 
organization, and a responsive lawmaker . . . .”24  In July 2010, Amber 
Ullman, a twenty-six-year-old mother from Summerfield, Florida, 
took her four-month-old daughter to the family’s pediatrician, Dr. 
Chris Okonkwo.25 Dr. Okonkwo, “a board-certified pediatrician 
specializing in comprehensive pediatric care,”26 began asking Mrs. 
Ullman a variety of questions.27 Included among those questions was 
one that pediatricians commonly ask,28 and the American Association 
of Pediatrics explicitly recommends:29 Were firearms kept in the 
Ullman household?30 
Surprised and insulted, Mrs. Ullman refused to answer Dr. 
Okonkwo’s question.31 Mrs. Ullman did not grasp why Dr. 
Okonkwo’s inquiry into firearm possession, which she regarded as 
privacy invasive, was necessary or relevant to her child’s medical care 
 
 24. Clay Calvert, Daniel Axelrod, Justin B. Hayes & Minch Minchin, Physicians, Firearms 
& Free Expression: Reconciling First Amendment Theory with Doctrinal Analysis Regarding the 
Right to Pose Questions to Patients, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2013) (footnotes omitted).  
 25. Melinda Carstensen, Scott Signs Doctor-Gun Measure, THE GAINESVILLE SUN (June 
3, 2011), http://www.gainesville.com/article/20110603/ARTICLES/110609797 [http://perma.cc/
H8AM-Q36K]. 
 26. Calvert et al., supra note 24, at 11. 
 27. Fred Hiers, Family and Pediatrician Tangle Over Gun Question, OCALA STAR-
BANNER (July 24, 2010), http://www.ocala.com/article/20100724/ARTICLES/7241001 [http://
perma.cc/H8S4-X2YT]. 
 28. See Gayland O. Hethcoat II, In the Crosshairs: Legislative Restrictions on Patient-
Physician Speech About Firearms, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 5 (2012) (classifying Dr. 
Okonkwo’s question regarding firearms in the home as a “typical query”).  
 29. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Firearm-Related Injuries 
Affecting the Pediatric Population, 130 PEDIATRICS 1416, 1421 (2012) (“The AAP recommends 
that pediatricians incorporate questions about the presence and availability of firearms into 
their patient history taking and urge parents who possess guns to prevent access to these guns by 
children.”); see also AM. MED. ASS’N, HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMA HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 138 (2015), http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/polfind/Hlth-Ethics.pdf [http://perma.
cc/NBM6-NGDW] (recommending that physicians “inquire as to the presence of household 
firearms as a part of childproofing the home” to help prevent accidental firearm deaths in 
children).  
 30. Stacey Singer, Pediatricians Say Gun Privacy Bill Would Muzzle Them, PALM BEACH 
POST (Apr. 23, 2011, 1:59 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/state-regional/
pediatricians-say-gun-privacy-bill-would-muzzle-th/nLrqP [http://perma.cc/Y7V2-4QVV].  
 31. See Hiers, supra note 27 (classifying Mrs. Ullman’s deflective actions as “defensive”).  
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or safety.32 Dr. Okonkwo, on the other hand, believed that the 
question was critical to his ability to provide full and complete 
medical care.33 To him, the inquiry was analogous to “ask[ing] parents 
whether they have pools at their homes so he can advise them about 
water safety.”34 Dr. Okonkwo attempted to assuage Mrs. Ullman’s 
concerns by explaining his rationale for asking these introductory 
questions,35 but his attempt was futile. Mrs. Ullman refused to answer, 
responding, “Didn’t you hear what I said? None of your damn 
business!”36 Dr. Okonkwo clarified for Mrs. Ullman that her refusal to 
answer the question “demonstrated a lack of trust—the cornerstone 
of the patient–physician relationship.”37 Consequently, Dr. Okonkwo 
terminated the physician–patient relationship and informed Mrs. 
Ullman that she had thirty days to find a new pediatrician.38 
This episode in Summerfield however, was not an isolated 
occurrence. Throughout Florida, constituents reported to their 
lawmakers that physicians were inquiring into their private possession 
of firearms. One legislator, for example, expressed concern after a 
constituent informed him that “a doctor had refused care upon a nine 
year old . . . because they wanted to know if they had a firearm in 
their home.”39 Another state legislator faced this situation personally 
when asked about gun ownership during a visit with his daughter to 
the family’s pediatrician.40 After the pediatrician asked that he 
remove any firearms from his family’s home, the legislator felt that 
his Second Amendment rights were under attack.41 
These narratives served as a springboard for a newly elected 
state representative to propose House Bill 155 in January 2011.42 As 
 
 32. See Singer, supra note 30 (stating that Mrs. Ullman explained that whether she owns a 
gun “has nothing to do with the health of [her] child”).  
 33. Hiers, supra note 27. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Helena Rho, The Pediatricians vs. the NRA, SLATE (Feb. 1, 2013, 2:53 PM), 
http://www. slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2013/02/pediatricians_and_
nra_physician_gag_rules_and_the_cdc_aca_and_states.html [http://perma.cc/64B5-JYPY].  
 37. Hethcoat II, supra note 28, at 6.  
 38. Id. at 6–7.  
 39. Brief for Appellants at 3, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 
2014) (No. 1:11-cv-22026-MGC), http://op.bna.com/hl.nsf/id/mapi92vmu9/$File/woll%20state's
%20brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/8Q6A-LDYW].  
 40. Id. at 3. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Calvert et al., supra note 24, at 13. 
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introduced, House Bill 155 proffered that verbal or written inquiries 
“concerning the ownership of a firearm by a patient or the family of a 
patient” by physicians or their staff “violate[] the privacy of the 
patient or the patient’s family members, respectively.”43 Additionally, 
the original version contained draconian punishments—violating the 
statute was a third-degree felony and exposed physicians to fines of 
up to $5 million dollars.44 After four months and several 
amendments,45 FOPA was codified in its current form.46 
FOPA imposes on healthcare practitioners47 four obligations 
relevant to the discussion here. First, the inquiry provision mandates 
that healthcare practitioners may not “mak[e] a written inquiry or 
ask[] questions concerning the ownership of a firearm or ammunition 
by the patient or by a family member of that patient,”48 unless that 
practitioner believes, in good faith, that the information is relevant.49 
Second, unless relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety, 
healthcare practitioners “may not intentionally enter any disclosed 
information concerning firearm ownership into the patient’s medical 
record.”50 As with the inquiry provision, however, physicians may 
keep records regarding firearm ownership if deemed relevant.51 Third, 
the harassment provision directs healthcare practitioners not to 
harass patients regarding firearm ownership or possession during an 
examination.52 Fourth, the discrimination provision provides that 
healthcare practitioners must “not discriminate against a patient 
based solely upon the patient’s exercise of the constitutional right to 
 
 43. H.B. 155, 113th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011).  
 44. Id. As codified, FOPA significantly reduced the disciplinary measures. See FLA. STAT. 
§ 456.072(2) (2014) (codifying the disciplinary actions). 
 45. Compare H.B. 155, 113th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011) (prohibiting “inquiries by 
physicians or other medical personnel concerning the [patient’s or family member’s] ownership 
of a firearm”), with FLA. STAT. § 790.388 (adding, inter alia, provisions addressing inquiries 
made in good faith that the information is relevant, inquiries by emergency medical 
professionals, and insurers’ use of information relating to firearm ownership). 
 46. See FLA. STAT. § 790.338 (codifying FOPA).  
 47. See FLA. STAT. § 456.001(4) (defining “[h]ealth care practitioner” as an individual 
licensed to give medical care under the Florida Statutes, including physicians).  
 48. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2); see also FLA. STAT. § 381.026(4)(b)(8) (codifying this 
provision in the Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities).  
 49. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2).   
 50. Id. § 790.338(1).  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. § 790.338(6); see also id. § 381.026(4)(b)(11) (codifying this provision in the Florida 
Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities).  
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own and possess firearms or ammunition.”53 Violating any of these 
provisions exposes the physician to a wide variety of punishments, 
including fines, reduction of practice,54 return of fees, probation, and 
revocation or suspension of the physician’s medical license.55 
2. The Wollschlaeger Case and Subsequent Litigation.  FOPA 
incited significant debate and condemnation.56 Supporters of the 
statute, including the National Rifle Association (NRA),57 argued that 
firearm possession is a private matter and is protected as a 
fundamental right by the Second Amendment.58 Additionally, 
supporters perceived the firearm inquiries as an expression of an 
“anti-gun political agenda,” not medical advice.59 FOPA’s opponents, 
on the other hand, claimed that instead of protecting privacy, FOPA 
intrudes upon the trust necessary to the patient–physician 
relationship.60 Furthermore, opponents countered, firearms do, in 
fact, present significant medical health risks.61 Thus, doctors ask these 
 
 53. Id. § 790.338(5); see also id. § 380.026(4)(b)(10) (codifying this provision in the Florida 
Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities).  
 54. Reduction of practice encompasses a wide variety of restrictions, including limitations 
on the following: the setting a physician can practice in, the type of services a physician can 
provide, the number of hours a physician can work, or “any other restriction found to be 
necessary for the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare.” Id. § 456.072(2)(c). 
 55. See id. § 456.072(2) (codifying the disciplinary actions).  
 56. See Jay Weaver, Miami Federal Judge Sides With ‘Docs’ Over ‘Glocks’ in Fla. Gun 
Rights Case, MIAMI HERALD (July 2, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-
government/article1940987.html [http://perma.cc/N37N-NBDY] (classifying the ensuing debate 
as “an ideological battle between advocates of free speech and the right to bear arms”).  
 57. See Frank Cerabino, Opinion, Talk to Me, Doc; Just Don’t Ask About My Guns, PALM 
BEACH POST (Feb. 24, 2011, 1:43 PM), http://m.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/cerabino-talk-
to-me-doc-just-dont-ask-about-my-gun/nLqL5 [http://perma.cc/5BRQ-3HRE] (claiming that the 
NRA lobbied the Florida Legislature “to criminalize the practice of responsible patient care”).  
 58. Hethcoat II, supra note 28, at 8. Florida Governor Rick Scott, for example, supported 
FOPA as a defender of Second Amendment rights. See Fla. Lawsuit: Can Doctors Ask Patients 
About Guns?, FOX NEWS (July 13, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/07/13/fla-lawsuit-can-
doctors-ask-patients-about-guns [http://perma.cc/M3ZQ-G63Y] (“I believe in the Second 
Amendment. I believe the citizens have a right to bear arms.”). Ironically, Governor Scott 
seemingly overlooked FOPA’s First Amendment implications. See id. (explaining Governor 
Scott’s assertion that citizens “should be able to lead . . . lives without people intruding on 
them”).  
 59. Greg Allen, Florida Bill Could Muzzle Doctors on Gun Safety, NPR (May 7, 2011, 7:31 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/07/136063523/florida-bill-could-muzzle-doctors-on-gun-safety 
[http://perma.cc/T7W4-8KJM].  
 60. Hethcoat II, supra note 28, at 9.  
 61. Kathleen Haughney, State Appeals ‘Docs v. Glocks’ Ruling, SUN-SENTINEL (July 31, 
2012), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-07-31/news/fl-state-appeals-docs-glocks-ruling-20120
731_1_glocks-state-appeals-state-associations [http://perma.cc/Z8F5-MBJ2].  
WEISS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/2015  10:34 AM 
2016] REMOVING THE “SILENCER” 809 
questions not to further their own political agenda, but rather to 
convey medical advice that helps prevent accidental injuries.62 Finally, 
opponents claimed that any politicizing of FOPA was a result of the 
NRA’s lobbying efforts.63 
Four days after FOPA was passed, a group of physicians and 
physician interest groups filed suit in the Southern District of Florida 
against various State officials,64 alleging that FOPA violates the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.65 As 
a threshold matter, the Southern District of Florida rejected the 
State’s argument that FOPA dodged First Amendment scrutiny as a 
regulation of conduct, not speech.66 Had the Southern District 
classified FOPA as a regulation of conduct, FOPA would “not [be] 
subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all.”67 And while the court did 
not explicitly decide what level of scrutiny to apply, the court 
undoubtedly applied some level of heightened scrutiny.68 Any 
decisional avoidance as to the appropriate level of scrutiny was solely 
because FOPA failed under either intermediate or strict scrutiny.69 
Consequently, the district court permanently enjoined enforcement of 
FOPA.70 
 
 62. See Allen, supra note 59 (diffusing opponents’ fears by explaining that asking 
preliminary questions is a form of “anticipatory guidance”).  
 63. See, e.g., Steve Bousquet, Guns and Florida: A Brief History, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 
7, 2013, 5:39 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/guns-and-florida-a-
brief-historybr-br-/1269376 [http://perma.cc/MA66-L2A5] (identifying Marion Hammer as the 
Florida lobbyist for the NRA); Fredereka Schouten, Little-Known Laws Shed Light on NRA 
Influence, USA TODAY (Jan. 15, 2013, 10:36 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/2013/01/15/nra-gun-friendly-laws/1833733 [http://perma.cc/MZK8-UGX8] (noting that 
“a Florida gun rights lobbyist and former NRA president” supported the law through the 
Florida legislature); Tom Watkins, How the NRA Wields Its Influence, CNN (Jan. 10, 2013, 
7:35 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/09/us/nra-gun-research [http://perma.cc/HB5F-WRDB] 
(“Gun-rights advocates, including the NRA, have raised concerns about tracking [firearm 
ownership] data, including the possibility that acknowledging legal gun ownership could bring 
higher insurance premiums.”).  
 64. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 
 65. Id.  
 66. See id. at 1262 (referencing the court’s preliminary injunction, in which the court 
determined that FOPA “did not constitute a permissible regulation of professional speech or 
occupational conduct that imposed a mere incidental burden on speech”).  
 67. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 68. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.  
 69. See id. (uncovering no reason to decide which standard applies); see also Calvert et al., 
supra note 24, at 31–35 (summarizing both the intermediate and strict scrutiny analyses 
conducted by the district court).   
 70. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.  
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The defendants appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.71 After the 
majority hurdled procedural obstacles,72 it held that FOPA regulated 
“professional conduct,” not speech.73 Thus, FOPA did not burden 
speech protected by the First Amendment.74 Because the First 
Amendment was not triggered, FOPA was not subject to any level of 
heightened constitutional scrutiny.75 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision and vacated the injunction 
against FOPA’s enforcement.76 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision, 
however, was not unanimous. Judge Wilson authored a lengthy 
dissent, which claimed that the majority’s opinion was 
“unprecedented.”77 According to Judge Wilson, “physician[s] must 
know all that a patient can articulate” to give a full diagnosis and 
treatment,78 and limiting that discussion does not “prevent irrelevant 
speech from harming the doctor-patient relationship.”79 It only 
“make[s] healthcare worse.”80 
Almost one year to the day after the original Wollschlaeger 
opinion was published,81 the Eleventh Circuit, shockingly, sua sponte 
substituted the original opinion with a revised opinion.82 Instead of 
holding that FOPA fell wholly outside the scope of First Amendment 
coverage as a regulation of conduct, as it did initially, in the revised 
opinion the court concluded that “the record-keeping, inquiry, and 
harassment provisions do regulate a significant amount of protected 
 
 71. Notice of Appeal at 1, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 
2014) (No. 12-14009).  
 72. See Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1209–13 (concluding that the plaintiffs have standing, 
and that their claims are ripe).  
 73. Id. at 1217.  
 74. See id. (construing FOPA as having merely “an incidental effect on physicians’ 
speech”). 
 75. See id. at 1225 n.17 (reasoning that because FOPA regulates conduct and not speech, 
“the First Amendment generally does not provide the physician with a shield”); see also id. at 
1219 (rationalizing that when a law does not burden a substantial amount of protected speech 
“it does not implicate constitutionally protected activity under the First Amendment” (quoting 
Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 2011))).  
 76. Id. at 1203.  
 77. Id. at 1231 (Wilson, J., dissenting).  
 78. Id. at 1237 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).  
 79. Id. at 1270–71.  
 80. Id. at 1271.  
 81. The original opinion was published on July 25, 2014, id., while the revised opinion was 
published on July 28, 2015. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 859 (11th Cir. 
2015).  
 82. Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 868.  
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speech.”83 As a result, the majority had two supplemental issues to 
decide: (1) the “level of scrutiny the First Amendment demands of 
these provisions,”84 and (2) whether FOPA passed constitutional 
muster under the applicable level of scrutiny.85 After establishing that 
FOPA was subject to intermediate scrutiny,86 the Eleventh Circuit 
held that FOPA survived constitutional scrutiny “as a permissible 
restriction of professional speech.”87 
Although Judge Wilson applauded the majority for finally 
“subject[ing] [FOPA] to First Amendment scrutiny,” he again 
dissented.88 Per Judge Wilson’s reading, rather than definitively 
holding that intermediate scrutiny applied to physician speech, the 
majority left “open the possibility of a more deferential approach to 
restrictions of speech within the boundaries of a professional 
relationship.”89 But even assuming for the sake of argument that 
intermediate scrutiny applied, Judge Wilson argued that FOPA not 
only “cause[s] doctors to know less, not more, about their patients’ 
firearm ownership status,”90 but also fails to protect patients’ privacy91 
or their Second Amendment rights.92 In fact, per Judge Wilson’s 
reading, protecting firearm owners from uneasy “questioning or 
counseling on firearm safety does not implicate Second Amendment 
concerns.”93 Thus, he would have held that FOPA is an 
unconstitutional restriction on physicians’ First Amendment rights.94 
 
 83. Id. at 886. To be sure, the majority opinion concluded that FOPA’s discrimination 
provision “is a regulation of professional conduct with merely an incidental effect on speech, 
and thus does not implicate the First Amendment.” Id.  
 84. Id. (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 230 (1985) (White, J., concurring)).  
 85. See id. at 896 (proceeding to consider whether FOPA passes the requisite level of 
scrutiny).  
 86. Id. (“Accordingly, we will proceed under the rubric of intermediate scrutiny.”).  
 87. Id. at 900.  
 88. Id. at 901 (Wilson, J., dissenting).  
 89. Id. at 909.  
 90. Id. at 923.  
 91. See id. at 925 (“[FOPA] plainly is more extensive than necessary to serve patients’ 
interest in keeping the information from their doctors and fails under . . . intermediate 
scrutiny.”).  
 92. See id. at 927 (acknowledging that Florida’s asserted Second Amendment interest 
“belies the State’s desire simply to silence a message with which it disagrees”).  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 909 (asserting that FOPA “is unconstitutional under either” strict or intermediate 
scrutiny).  
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B. A Brief Overview of the First Amendment 
The First Amendment, which has been construed to guarantee 
speech and association rights,95 mandates that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”96 But freedom of speech 
is not an absolute right.97 Rather, the First Amendment provides 
tiered levels of protection, which are determined by “the nature of 
the speech or association, the nature of the regulation, and the 
location where it occurs.”98 Thus, while certain types of speech receive 
the strongest protection the Constitution has to offer,99 others receive 
no protection at all.100 
There are two primary categories of restrictions on speech: 
content-based and content-neutral.101 When a regulation restricts 
speech because of its “subject matter[] or its content,”102 it is generally 
considered a content-based restriction.103 Because the First 
Amendment commands that the “government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message [or] its ideas,”104 these 
content-based restrictions are “presumptively invalid” and subject to 
strict scrutiny.105 On the other hand, a regulation that applies to all 
speech regardless of content is generally considered content-
 
 95. See Cty. Sec. Agency v. Ohio Dep’t of Commerce, 296 F.3d 477, 486 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(referencing the “strong protection” afforded by the First Amendment); Robert A. Sedler, An 
Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 377, 379 (“The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
freedom of speech very expansively, and the constitutional protection afforded to freedom of 
speech is perhaps the strongest protection afforded to any individual right under the 
Constitution.”).  
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 97. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 961 
(4th ed. 2011) (acknowledging that “there are some categories of speech that are unprotected or 
less protected by the First Amendment”).  
 98. Kelly P. Welch, Note, Graffiti and the Constitution: A First Amendment Analysis of the 
Los Angeles Tagging Crew Injunction, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 214 (2011).  
 99. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (recognizing that content-based restrictions 
on political speech in a public forum are “subjected to the most exacting scrutiny”).  
 100. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (noting that “‘fighting’ 
words” receive no First Amendment Protection).  
 101. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 58 (1987) 
(referencing both content-based and content-neutral regulations).  
 102. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972).   
 103. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 960 (“The Supreme Court frequently has declared 
that the very core of the First Amendment is that the government cannot regulate speech based 
on its content.”).  
 104. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.  
 105. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).  
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neutral.106 These types of restrictions are less objectionable because 
they do not single out specific content. Accordingly, they receive only 
intermediate scrutiny.107 
Content-based and content-neutral regulations are not the only 
speech restrictions addressed by the First Amendment. For instance, 
certain types of speech receive a lower species of constitutional 
protection.108 This category includes commercial speech,109 
professional speech,110 and low value sexual speech.111 Furthermore, 
some speech falls completely outside of the First Amendment’s 
coverage and fails to trigger any Constitutional protection.112 Any 
restrictions on these types of speech are thus upheld as 
constitutionally permissible. 
C. Regulating Healthcare Under the State’s Police Power 
The most common use of the states’ police power to restrict 
physician speech is through licensure.113 As early as 1889,114 the 
Supreme Court recognized that the government may limit physician 
speech to only those citizens that possess a license. In Dent v. West 
Virginia,115 the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality116 of a 
regulation that required physicians to possess a “certificate from the 
 
 106. See Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 
(1984) (explaining the content-neutrality of the law at issue). These regulations must be both 
viewpoint neutral and subject-matter neutral. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 961.  
 107. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).  
 108. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004) (noting that the 
First Amendment applies different levels of protection to certain types of speech).  
 109. For a discussion of the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech, see infra 
notes 262–66 and accompanying text.  
 110. For an argument that professional speech deserves intermediate scrutiny, see infra Part 
III.A.  
 111. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to a restriction on nonobscene sexual speech).  
 112. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (explaining that the 
“lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words” do not enjoy 
the First Amendment’s coverage).  
 113. See Shawn L. Fultz, Comment, If It Quacks Like a Duck: Reviewing Health Care 
Providers’ Speech Restrictions Under the First Prong of Central Hudson, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 
571 (2013) (noting that states often use their police power to regulate professions through the 
issuance of licenses).  
 114. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (recognizing the state’s inherent 
licensing ability).  
 115. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).  
 116. The constitutional claim in Dent was a due-process claim. Id. at 121.   
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State Board of Health” to practice medicine.117 The Supreme Court 
affirmed that “[t]he power of the State to provide for the general 
welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, 
in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the 
consequences of ignorance and incapacity.”118 The Court emphasized 
the importance of this power as applied to the medical field.119 
Because the regulation promoted proficiency in the practice of 
medicine, the license requirement was upheld as a proper use of West 
Virginia’s police powers.120 
In Watson v. Maryland,121 the Supreme Court again recognized 
the states’ legitimate interest in restricting physician speech through 
regulating the medical field. Maryland, pursuant to its police powers, 
made it a crime to practice medicine without applying for and 
obtaining a license.122 The licensure requirement was predicated on 
the fact that “[d]ealing . . . with the lives and health of the people” 
requires a particular level of skill and education.123 Those that lacked 
the requisite skill and education were unable to speak as physicians. 
Since licensure regulations are “within the legislative capacity of the 
State in the exercise of its police power,”124 the regulation was held 
constitutionally permissible.125 
Moreover, the states’ authority to restrict speech through 
licensure is not limited in scope; it encompasses a wide swath of 
healthcare professions. For instance, in Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma Inc.,126 the Supreme Court considered a statute that 
restricted opticians from fitting eyeglasses without a prescription to 
 
 117. Id. at 115.   
 118. Id. at 122.  
 119. See id. (“Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it 
than that of medicine.”).  
 120. Id. at 128.  
 121. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910).  
 122. Id. at 174. As in Dent, the primary constitutional claim was a due-process claim. Id. at 
175. 
 123. Id. at 176. By the time of the Watson decision, it was well recognized and widely 
accepted that states possessed the ability to execute licensure requirements. See id. (“To this 
end many of the States of the Union have enacted statutes which require the practitioner of 
medicine to submit to an examination . . . and to receive duly authenticated certificates showing 
that they are deemed to possess the necessary qualifications of learning, skill and character 
essential to their calling.”). 
 124. Id. at 178.  
 125. Id. at 180.  
 126. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).  
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do so from an ophthalmologist or optometrist.127 Because the 
opticians engaged in medical practices,128 they could be subject to 
professional regulations—notably, the licensure restriction.129 
Similarly, in National Association for the Advancement of 
Psychoanalysis v. California Board of Psychology,130 the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the constitutionality of a licensure requirement for 
psychoanalysts.131 Since the court recognized that California could 
regulate the licensing of a physician,132 the regulation on 
psychoanalysts was properly upheld.133 
Beyond simple licensure requirements, states commonly 
implement other restrictions via their police power to protect “the 
welfare and safety of society.”134 One such regulatory avenue restricts 
specified conduct within the medical profession. In Semler v. Oregon 
State Board of Dental Examiners,135 the Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of a statute that sanctioned dentists from advertising 
their professional services.136 At the outset, the Court tersely affirmed 
that “the protective power of the State”137 conclusively encompasses 
the ability to regulate the dental profession.138 Because the advertising 
restriction fell within the State’s police powers, the sanctions against 
dentist advertising were upheld as permissible.139 
 
 127. Id. at 485 n.1.  
 128. Williamson implies that anything pertaining to the body’s health is considered medical 
care. See id. at 490 (explaining that opticians “enter the field of health” because eyeglass frames, 
coupled with corrective lenses, pertain to the human eye).  
 129. See id. at 491 (upholding the license requirement on fitting eyeglasses).  
 130. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 
1043 (9th Cir. 2000).  
 131. Id. at 1047.  
 132. See id. at 1050 (“[M]ost federal courts have held that a patient does not have a 
constitutional right to obtain a particular type of treatment or to obtain the treatment from a 
particular provider if the government has reasonably prohibited that type of treatment or 
provider.” (quoting Mitchell v. Clayton, 955 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993))). 
 133. Id. at 1054. Notably, the court also held that the licensure scheme did not violate any 
First Amendment rights. See id. at 1053 (“[E]ven if a speech interest is implicated, California’s 
licensing scheme passes First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
 134. Fultz, supra note 113, at 572.   
 135. Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).  
 136. Id. at 609.  
 137. Id. at 610.  
 138. See id. at 611 (noting that states’ capacity to regulate the practice of dentistry is “not 
open to dispute”).  
 139. Id.  
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Further, states may employ their police powers to protect citizens 
from incompetent professionals by delineating professional 
standards.140 This power is intimately tied with, yet not identical to, a 
state’s licensing authority.141 When a professional violates a state’s 
professional standards, that state may impose sanctions to promote 
and shelter public safety.142 Sanctions may include monetary fines143 
and license suspension or revocation.144 Although these sanctions 
cannot undo the harm already incurred by patients or clients, they 
assist in preventing any future harm.145 
II.  PHYSICIAN SPEECH AS FREE SPEECH 
A fog of confusion surrounds the professional speech doctrine as 
applied to physician speech.146 Much of this perplexity stems from 
Justice Douglas’s aforementioned statement that “[t]he right of the 
doctor to advise his patients according to his best lights seems so 
 
 140. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he state 
may have an interest in shielding the public against the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the 
irresponsible . . . .”); see also Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of 
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Thomas 
to emphasize the compelling state interest in regulating the medical profession through 
licensing).  
 141. See Semler, 294 U.S. at 611 (recognizing that states “may require licenses and establish 
supervision by an administrative board”).  
 142. See Lap v. Axelrod, 467 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (upholding a 
revocation of a license as a discipline to protect clients from individuals that commit crimes 
intimately tied with the industry that they are licensed to participate in).   
 143. See Trisha’s One Stop, Inc. v. Office of Fin. Regulation, 130 So.3d 285, 288 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014) (fining an operator of a check-cashing business under the state’s professional 
regulatory authority).  
 144. Arthur v. D.C. Nurses’ Examining Bd., 459 A.2d 141, 147 (D.C. 1983) (citing Proctor v. 
Hackers’ Bd., 268 A.2d 267, 269 (D.C. 1970)).  
 145. Fultz, supra note 113, at 573.  
 146. See, e.g., Calvert et al., supra note 24, at 44 (referencing the “gray area” regarding the 
standard that courts apply to restrictions imposed on physician speech); Renee Newman Knake, 
Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639, 645 (2011) (explaining 
that the level of protection afforded to attorney advice is not clear); David T. Moldenhauer, 
Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First Amendment Limitations on the 
Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843, 843 (2006) (“The 
regulation of professional speech is one of the least developed areas of First Amendment 
doctrine.”); W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 305 
(2001) (noting that the manner in which the First Amendment should apply to attorneys is 
“[o]ne of the most important unanswered questions in legal ethics”); Jacob M. Victor, Note, 
Regulating Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: The California Approach, Its Limitations, and 
Potential Alternatives, 123 YALE L.J. 1532, 1578 (2014) (classifying the question as to how much 
First Amendment protection extends to professional speech as “complicated”). 
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obviously within First Amendment rights as to need no extended 
discussion.”147 Ever since Justice Douglas’s comments, however, the 
Supreme Court has offered little guidance into the rights of physicians 
to speak to their patients.148 Although it is beyond the scope of this 
Note to fully expound upon the boundaries of the professional speech 
doctrine, this Part argues that physician speech should at least be 
covered by the First Amendment’s protective shield. Section A 
outlines the origins of the professional speech doctrine. Section B 
discusses the coverage of the First Amendment, and summarizes the 
majority’s divergent approaches in his Wollschlaeger opinions. 
Section C offers a different justification than the Wollschlaeger 
majority’s for First Amendment coverage of physician speech and 
proposes an alternative test to determine when physician speech is 
covered. 
A. The Professional Speech Doctrine 
Professional speech is generally defined as “personalized 
communication given in the context of a fiduciary-like relationship 
between a person who adheres to a shared body of professional 
knowledge and values and that person’s client.”149 Although different 
from political150 or commercial speech,151 professional speech 
nonetheless deserves First Amendment protection.152 
Justice White’s concurrence in Lowe v. SEC153 is often credited 
with establishing the contours of the professional speech doctrine.154 
In Lowe, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Securities 
 
 147. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For an example of a 
court struggling with the diverging interests in protecting physician speech, see Stuart v. 
Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (addressing North Carolina’s Woman’s Right to Know 
Act). 
 148. See Calvert et al., supra note 24, at 44 (stating that “[t]he Court has offered only 
cursory comments” discussing physicians’ First Amendment rights). 
 149. Moldenhauer, supra note 146, at 892.  
 150. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (explaining that “[c]ontent-
based regulations are presumptively invalid” under the First Amendment).  
 151. For a discussion of the First Amendment’s coverage of commercial speech, see infra 
notes 293–301 and accompanying text.  
 152. See, e.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 235 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding that 
professional speech deserves First Amendment protection).  
 153. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211–36 (1985) (White, J., concurring).  
 154. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 7, at 842–43 (using Justice White’s concurrence in 
Lowe to outline the professional-speech doctrine’s foundational contours); see also Keighley, 
supra note 8, at 2368 (employing Justice White’s concurrence to establish the contours of the 
professional speech doctrine).  
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Exchange Commission could forbid unlicensed “investment advisers” 
from publishing general investment advice and commentary in 
various securities newsletters.155 The unlicensed advisors “contend[ed] 
that such an injunction str[uck] at the very foundation of the freedom 
of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship.”156 The majority 
opinion, however, avoided the constitutional question by concluding 
that the petitioners were not “investment adviser[s]” as statutorily 
defined.157 Thus, the regulation was inapplicable and the SEC could 
not restrict the petitioners from publicizing their newsletters.158 
Justice White, however, concluded that the petitioners were 
“investment adviser[s].”159 And so, he could not dodge the 
constitutional question at issue: whether the SEC violated the First 
Amendment by preventing unlicensed investment advisers from 
publishing general investment advice.160 Justice White recognized the 
diverging interests at issue. On one hand, the First Amendment 
guarantees the freedom of speech for American citizens.161 On the 
other, the government has the power to license and regulate those 
who desire to pursue a specific profession or vocation.162 Although the 
latter interest is undoubtedly legitimate, certain regulatory measures 
leap past the line of permissibility and become speech restrictions.163 
As applied to Lowe, that is exactly what the SEC did—it 
implemented a “direct restraint on freedom of speech and of the 
press.”164 Justice White therefore concurred with the majority in 
result, but would have struck down the SEC’s regulation as 
unconstitutional.165 
Justice White’s opinion gave significant guidance to later courts 
on how to distinguish between permissible regulations of professional 
 
 155. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 183.  
 156. Id. at 189 (citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938)).  
 157. Id. at 211 (White, J., concurring).  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 228.  
 162. Id.  
 163. See id. at 230 (“At some point, a measure is no longer a regulation of a profession but a 
regulation of speech or of the press; beyond that point, the statute must survive the level of 
scrutiny demanded by the First Amendment.”).  
 164. Id. at 233.  
 165. Id. at 236.  
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conduct and impermissible infringements of freedom of speech.166 For 
example, governments may “enact[] generally applicable licensing 
provisions limiting the class of persons who may practice the 
profession.”167 Professionals are categorized as those “who take[] the 
affairs of a client personally in hand and purport[] to exercise 
judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client’s individual 
needs and circumstances.”168 It is irrelevant that licensing provisions 
may implicate speech concerns—any burden is merely “incidental to 
the conduct of the profession.”169 Conversely, where no personal 
nexus exists between professional and client,170 government 
restrictions stop operating as proper regulations of professional 
practice that only incidentally impact speech.171 Simply put, there is no 
profession being regulated. Instead, they serve as a direct regulation 
of speech subject to heightened scrutiny under the First 
Amendment.172 Justice White did not address, however, the level of 
First Amendment protection dedicated to speech regulated within the 
professional-client nexus. 
 
 166. Id. at 231–33. Markedly, Justice White cited Justice Jackson’s concurrence positively 
when he asserted that “the state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without 
its license,” but could not “make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to 
follow or reject any school of medical thought.” Id. at 231 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 544–48 (1945)).   
 167. Id. (emphasis added). 
 168. Id. at 232.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Suppose a physician spoke at a political rally for or against abortion regulation. In this 
hypothetical circumstance, there would be no personal nexus between the professional and 
client; the physician is speaking on his or her own accord. On the other hand, consider a statute 
that restricts the practice of unlicensed certified public accountants. See Accountant’s Soc. of 
Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 603 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing a similar statutory scheme). The 
statute would implicate speech falling within the personal nexus between professional and 
client, as the implicated speech would be flowing from a professional to a client. Id. at 605.  
 171. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring).  
 172. See id. at 232 & n.11 (citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931)) 
(stating that regulating where no professional relationship exists “becomes [a] regulation of 
speaking . . . subject to the First Amendment[]”); see also Robert Kry, The “Watchman for 
Truth”: Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885, 953 (2000) 
(explaining that in Justice White’s test, the personal nexus serves as the “distinction between 
fully protected publishing activities and professional practice”); Moldenhauer, supra note 146, at 
885 (opining that the distinction between the state’s power to enact restrictions on professions 
turns on whether a “personal nexus” exists between a professional and their client).  
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B. First Amendment Coverage of Physician Speech 
The first question in any First Amendment analysis is whether 
First Amendment protection is triggered.173 As Professor Frederick 
Schauer explains, this is primarily a question of coverage.174 Certain 
acts, words, or behaviors simply do not enjoy any First Amendment 
protection whatsoever.175 Because the speech is not covered, it “does 
not present a First Amendment issue at all.”176 Put differently, “[t]he 
First Amendment just does not show up.”177 
1. The First Attempt—Conditioning the First Amendment on a 
Categorization of Conduct.  Judge Tjoflat, in writing the original 
majority’s opinion, began by recognizing that professional speech is 
not wholly removed from First Amendment coverage.178 Instead, 
professional speech is subject to a spectrum of constitutional 
protection.179 At one extreme, professionals “engaged in a public 
dialogue”180 receive the greatest amount of First Amendment 
protection and are thus presumptively covered by the First 
Amendment. At the midpoint of the spectrum lies speech that 
requires professionals to communicate specific information to their 
 
 173. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and 
Speech, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 395, 397 (2014) (illuminating that the preliminary question is 
whether the First Amendment covers the expression); see also Frederick Schauer, Categories 
and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 268 (1981) (explaining 
that the First Amendment is implicated when speech at issue “is set off by the [F]irst 
[A]mendment for special protection”). This “coverage” requirement is not unique to the First 
Amendment—it is pertinent to other constitutional rights. See, e.g., United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the threshold inquiry in Second 
Amendment challenges is “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling 
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee”).  
 174. Schauer, supra note 108, at 1769. 
 175. See id. (“The acts, behaviors, and restrictions not encompassed by the First 
Amendment at all—the events that remain wholly untouched by the First Amendment—are . . . 
consequently measured against no First Amendment standard whatsoever.”).   
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1218 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that 
First Amendment protections reach their pinnacle when a professional speaks publicly on a 
matter of public concern, but reach “a nadir” when a professional “speaks privately, in the 
course of exercising his or her professional judgment, to a person receiving the professional’s 
services”).  
 179. See id. at 1219 (referencing the “spectrum” of professional speech).  
 180. Id. at 1223 (quoting Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227 (9th Cir. 2014)). This type of 
speech receives strict scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) 
(recognizing that regulations that target speech because of its content receive “the most 
exacting” constitutional scrutiny).  
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clients.181 At the other extreme is the “regulation of professional 
conduct, where the state’s power is great, even though such regulation 
may have an incidental effect on speech.”182 In this scenario, any 
implicated speech is simply incidental to the permissible regulation 
and thus is not covered by the First Amendment.183 
Using this conduct-regulation theory of the professional speech 
doctrine’s coverage, the majority upheld each challenged provision of 
FOPA without applying heightened scrutiny.184 The inquiry 
provision185 applied to speech in the physician’s examination room, 
where the “personal nexus between professional and client” is most 
acute.186 Further, it merely informed physicians that, according to 
Florida, inquiring into firearm ownership was not a practice of good 
medicine.187 Thus, the court categorized the provision as a “regulation 
of professional conduct” that fell outside of the First Amendment’s 
coverage.188 Likewise, the record-keeping provision189 regulated 
professional conduct, and any burden on speech was merely 
incidental to FOPA’s regulation of the medical field.190 Although the 
discrimination191 and harassment provisions192 may not have regulated 
speech at all,193 if they did, any burden was considered incidental to 
the regulation of professional conduct.194 Consequently, the majority 
 
 181. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1223 (citing Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228). This Note argues that 
this speech receives intermediate scrutiny. See infra Part III.A. 
 182. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229). Although not 
discussed in the majority’s original opinion, the First Amendment does apply to certain types of 
conduct. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional 
Rights, Inc. (FAIR II), 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006)) (explaining that First Amendment protection 
only extends to conduct that is “inherently expressive”).  
 183. See Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1217 (finding that FOPA only incidentally affects 
physician speech, and thus, fell outside of the First Amendment’s coverage).  
 184. See id. at 1226 (holding that FOPA does not trigger First Amendment protection).  
 185. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (2014).  
 186. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, 
J., concurring)).  
 187. Id. at 1219–20.  
 188. Id. at 1220 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) 
(plurality opinion)).  
 189. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(1).  
 190. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1221.  
 191. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(5).  
 192. Id. § 790.338(6).  
 193. See Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1221 (asserting that the discrimination provision validly 
regulates professional conduct and “only incidentally—if at all—affects physician speech”); see 
also id. (claiming that harassment can involve speech).  
 194. Id.  
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held that FOPA fell outside First Amendment coverage, and 
therefore did not facially violate the Constitution.195 
2. Taking a Second Shot—The Majority’s Two-Dimensional Test.  
After sua sponte vacating its original opinion, the Eleventh Circuit’s 
revised Wollschlaeger opinion disregarded the conduct–speech 
distinction originally employed and instead focused on “the landscape 
of professional speech.”196 The majority began by observing that 
“[t]here is a difference, for First Amendment purposes, between . . . 
professionals’ speech to the public at large versus their direct 
personalized speech with clients.”197 Speech voiced by a professional 
in support of “his or her profession and within the confines of a 
professional-client relationship,” for instance, is properly considered 
professional speech.198 On the other hand, “speech uttered by a 
professional that is irrelative to the practice of his or her profession 
and outside a particular professional-client relationship likely falls 
beyond the purview of professional speech.”199 
To help distinguish between professional speech deserving of 
protection and undeserving nonprofessional speech, the majority 
proposed a two-dimensional test that turns on “the professional 
effectivity of the speech—whether the physician is speaking in 
furtherance of the practice of medicine or not, and the relational 
context of the speech—whether the physician is speaking within a 
fiduciary relationship or not.”200 When considered in tandem, these 
two factors divide speech uttered by physicians into four categories: 
(1) speech uttered by a physician “to the public, in furtherance of the 
practice of medicine”; (2) speech uttered by a physician “to a client, 
in furtherance of the practice of medicine”; (3) speech uttered by a 
physician “to a client, on a matter irrelative to the practice of 
medicine”; and (4) speech uttered by a physician “to the public, on a 
matter irrelative to the practice of medicine.”201 At issue in 
Wollschlaeger was the second category—speech uttered by a 
 
 195. Id. at 1226.  
 196. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 886 (11th Cir. 2015).  
 197. Id. at 887 (quoting Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011)).  
 198. Id. (citing King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014)).  
 199. Id. (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring)).  
 200. Id. at 888.  
 201. Id. 
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professional “to a client, in furtherance of the practice of medicine.”202 
Rather than focusing primarily on whether FOPA targeted conduct 
or speech, however, the majority conceded that FOPA implicated the 
First Amendment and proceeded to subject the speech to heightened 
scrutiny.203 
The majority framed its analysis around the government’s 
interest in regulating physician speech. With regards to the 
“professional effectivity of the speech,” the majority stated that “the 
government’s interest in regulating the profession for the protection 
of the public . . . is strongest when a professional speaks in 
furtherance of his profession.”204 By contrast, the professional’s 
interest in speaking freely is “strongest when he speaks on matters 
unrelated to his profession and weakest when he speaks in 
furtherance of his profession.”205 As for the relational context of 
speech, the majority opined that “the government has a strong 
interest in policing the boundaries of the relationship to protect the 
weaker party from exploitation.”206 When “[o]utside the confines of 
such relationships, the government’s interest in protecting the listener 
wanes, and instead the interest of the physician’s audience in 
obtaining information reaches its zenith.”207 Ultimately, the court held 
that FOPA passed constitutional muster under intermediate 
scrutiny.208 
3. The Coverage of Physician Speech.  Presumably, the majority 
vacated its original opinion and substituted in its place a revised 
opinion because the former ignored certain intricacies of First 
Amendment coverage. As explained by Judge Wilson in his original 
dissent, regulations must be subjected to “heightened scrutiny 
whenever the government restricts speech because of disagreement 
with the message it conveys.”209 Certainly, the state may implement 
 
 202. Id.; see also id. at 869 (discussing that FOPA regulates physicians’ inquiries into 
whether a patient owns a firearm for the purpose of medical care).  
 203. See id. at 891 (“[W]e conclude that [FOPA] is a regulation of professional speech.”).  
 204. Id. at 889.  
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. at 900.  
 209. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1236 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011)). Judge Wilson 
chided the original majority opinion for creating an improper exception to First Amendment 
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licensing and regulatory schemes to restrict certain professional 
speech,210 but physicians do not “simply abandon their First 
Amendment rights when they commence practicing a profession.”211 
Rather, “speech is speech, and it must be analyzed as such for 
purposes of the First Amendment.”212 And speech stemming from the 
physician–patient relationship is presumptively encompassed within 
the First Amendment’s protective sphere.213 
Further, courts cannot simply play a “labeling game”214 by 
designating speech as conduct to dodge First Amendment scrutiny. 
Even when certain laws regulate conduct, they are nonetheless 
subject to First Amendment scrutiny when “the conduct triggering 
coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message.”215 
To determine whether a regulation targets speech or conduct, courts 
generally focus on the “transmission of ideas.”216 Thus, the state’s 
ability to regulate speech turns on whether that speech is 
“communicative.”217 Regulations targeting conduct concern speech’s 
“noncommunicative component,” whereas regulations targeting 
speech concern speech’s “communicative component.”218 And 
 
coverage. See id. (“The word ‘whenever’ does not invite exceptions, but the Majority creates 
one anyway.”).  
 210. For a discussion of the state’s ability to regulate the classes of individuals able to speak 
as a professional, see supra Part II.C. See also Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir. 
2014) (referencing King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014), to explain 
that licensing provides confidence to clients that their lives are in safe hands).  
 211. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 247.  
 212. King, 767 F.3d at 229.  
 213. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (dictum) (“[T]raditional relationships 
such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment 
from Government regulation, even when subsidized by the Government.”). Although this 
statement is dictum, it nonetheless hints that physician speech is within First Amendment 
coverage.  
 214. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).  
 215. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010).  
 216. Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the 
First Amendment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1423, 1475 (2014).  
 217. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580 (1978) (explaining 
that First Amendment protections are aimed at those governmental actions focused on 
“communicative impact”); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, 
Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1314 (2005) (collecting cases). But see Schauer, supra note 173, at 279 
(“[Communicative impact] theory is incomplete, however, unless it provides some guidance, 
derived again from the deep theory of the principle of free speech, in determining what species 
of communicative impact are covered and what species of communicative impact are not.”).  
 218. Volokh, supra note 217, at 1314. 
WEISS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/2015  10:34 AM 
2016] REMOVING THE “SILENCER” 825 
communicative speech, even if uttered by a professional to his client, 
must be subject to heightened scrutiny.219 
For example, in King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey220 the 
Third Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute 
that restricted licensed counselors from partaking in “sexual 
orientation change efforts” with patients younger than eighteen years 
of age.221 The plaintiffs challenged this statutory scheme, alleging that 
it violated the First Amendment by restricting the physician’s right to 
speak.222 The court held that New Jersey’s statutory scheme regulated 
physician speech—not simply conduct223—because New Jersey 
prohibited a professional practice that is carried out by way of verbal 
communication.224 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the First 
Amendment does cover physician speech and, as such, required the 
application of the appropriate level of heightened scrutiny.225 
Similarly, in Stuart v. Camnitz226 the Fourth Circuit addressed the 
constitutionality of North Carolina’s Woman’s Right to Know Act.227 
The Act required physicians to perform an ultrasound, display the 
image, and describe the fetus before an abortion “even if the woman 
actively ‘averts her eyes’ and ‘refuses to hear.’”228 A group of 
physicians filed suit, arguing that the compelled speech violated the 
First Amendment.229 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the 
statute regulated conduct, “insofar as it directs doctors to do certain 
things in the context of treating a patient.”230 But that was not the end 
of the matter—the statute required doctors to communicate the 
descriptions mandated verbally.231 Thus, both professional conduct 
 
 219. Cf. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1220 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (suggesting that regulations of 
professional communication are subject to “some degree of scrutiny”).   
 220. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014).  
 221. Id. at 221 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1–55 (West 2013)).  
 222. Id. at 222.  
 223. See id. at 233 (“While the function of this speech does not render it ‘conduct’ that is 
wholly outside the scope of the First Amendment, it does place it within a recognized category 
of speech that is not entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.”).  
 224. See id. (holding that professional speech receives some diminished protection under the 
First Amendment). 
 225. See id. (holding that classifying the regulation at issue as professional speech “does not 
end [the constitutional] inquiry,” and thus, moving on to determine the level of scrutiny).  
 226. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 227. Id. at 242. 
 228. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90–21.85(b) (2011)).  
 229. Id. at 243. 
 230. Id. at 248.  
 231. Id. at 245.  
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and professional speech were implicated.232 Consequently, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the Act burdened physician speech and thus 
triggered First Amendment coverage.233 
Three characteristics of the speech at issue in both King and 
Camnitz are integral when considering First Amendment coverage of 
physician speech. First, the speech at issue occurred in a professional 
relationship—the physician–patient relationship. Second, the speech 
in both scenarios, whether compelled or prohibited, was 
communicative.234 If the “speech” at issue were noncommunicative, 
the regulations would not enjoy First Amendment coverage.235 
Finally, the regulations in both cases were content based. Were the 
regulations content neutral, they may have avoided First Amendment 
coverage.236 All three of these characteristics are necessary for 
physician speech to receive First Amendment protection. 
C. Finding the Target: Rationalizing the Coverage and Boundaries of 
Physician Speech 
The discussion up to this point has served as a backdrop to the 
conflicting Wollschlaeger opinions. This Part may add to that 
confusion by arguing that the second Wollschlaeger opinion, which 
concluded that FOPA implicated the First Amendment, was correct 
in part—albeit for the wrong reasons. First, this Part argues that the 
“government’s interest in regulating the profession for the protection 
of the public”237 does not justify First Amendment coverage of 
 
 232. See id. at 248 (“[The statute] requires doctors to ‘say’ as well as ‘do.’”).  
 233. See id. at 251 (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 229–30 (1985) (White, J., concurring)) 
(holding that regulations restricting the free speech rights of professionals must pass 
constitutional scrutiny and adding that “[t]hough physicians and other professionals may be 
subject to regulations by the state that restrict their First Amendment freedoms when acting in 
the course of their professions, professionals do not leave their speech rights at the office door” 
(citation omitted)).  
 234. See id. at 245 (explaining that “the display of the sonogram is plainly an expressive act,” 
and thus, is sufficiently communicative to engender First Amendment protection); King v. 
Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding “that the verbal communication” at 
issue is communicative, and thus, enjoys First Amendment protection).  
 235. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (citing NLRB v. Fruit & 
Vegetable Packers Union, 377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)) (recognizing that if the 
restricted speech was noncommunicative, it could properly be regulated as conduct); see also 
supra notes 214–33 and accompanying text (distinguishing between speech and conduct). 
 236. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1241 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that Lowe v. SEC implies a requirement of content neutrality to qualify as 
a permissible regulation of professional conduct).  
 237. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 889 (11th Cir. 2015).  
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physician speech. Rather, the centrality of trust in all physician–
patient relationships justifies First Amendment protection. Second, 
this Part rationalizes when the First Amendment should cover 
physician speech. Particularly, it outlines an alternative test for when 
physician speech should enjoy First Amendment coverage. 
1. Why The First Amendment Should Cover Physician Speech.  
First, regulations that restrict physician speech substantially 
undermine the foundation of the physician–patient relationship—
trust.238 Trust in the medical context is defined as a psychological state 
on the part of both patients and physicians that entails an “optimistic 
attitude towards one’s vulnerability.”239 Trust is not simply desirable 
in the physician–patient relationship; it serves as “the ‘glue’ that holds 
the relationship together and makes it possible.”240 Trust is “essential 
and unavoidable.”241 And although not unique to medicine, trust is 
more important in the physician–patient relationship than many 
relationships.242 In fact, one of the very reasons patients seek medical 
treatment is to obtain medical care and uninhibited medicinal 
information.243 But without trust, patients would not possess enough 
faith in “their care-givers . . . to lay themselves bare, both physically 
and emotionally, so the true causes of illness can be understood.”244 
Patients trust physicians because they believe they are receiving 
their physicians’ expert opinion.245 When regulations prohibit 
physicians from inquiring about a certain topic, however, that trust is 
diminished.246 Diminishing trust and reducing disclosure is significant. 
It misleads patients’ medical decisionmaking because they “have no 
 
 238. See Post, supra note 8, at 977 (explaining that trust is embedded in the physician–
patient relationship).  
 239. Mark Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 474 (2002).  
 240. Id. at 470.  
 241. Id.   
 242. Id. at 471 (explaining that medicinal trust “is paralleled only in fraternal, family, or love 
relationships”).  
 243. Cf. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 233 (3d Cir. 2014) (justifying First 
Amendment coverage of information that “facilitates the ‘free flow of commercial information,’ 
in which . . . the intended recipients . . . have a strong interest” (quoting Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 (1976))). 
 244. Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical 
Research, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423, 426 (2001).  
 245. See Post, supra note 8, at 978 (“[Patients] wish to receive knowledge that our doctors 
can uniquely provide . . . .”).  
 246. See id. at 977–78 (noting that physicians assume a fiduciary obligation to communicate 
knowledge that the patient can rely on to decide what their medical care ought to be).  
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comparable alternative means of acquiring medical information.”247 
Further, restricting physician speech undermines the patient’s 
expectations because the physician is unable to supply the care that 
the patient seeks.248 But it is not just patients who rely on trust in a 
medical examining room—physicians trust that “patient[s] will 
candidly disclose information necessary for the best treatment.”249 
Therefore, regulations that breach the examination room walls by 
restricting physician speech vitiate the physician–patient relationship 
and impose a net-negative result. 
The second Wollschlaeger majority opinion, however, argues that 
patients are relatively powerless in a physician’s examination room 
and that states bolster physician–patient trust by “regulat[ing] the 
practice of professions to ‘shield the public against the untrustworthy, 
the incompetent, or the irresponsible.’”250 Thus, the government’s 
interest in regulating physician speech is strongest “[w]hen a 
physician speaks to a patient in furtherance of the practice of 
medicine.”251 But this argument is unavailing. First, the allusion to 
“shield[ing] the public against the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or 
the irresponsible” is inapposite because that statement was in 
reference to a licensing regime;252 indubitably, states have the 
authority to protect patients from the incompetent through a 
licensing scheme.253 Second, allowing the state to regulate speech 
through conscripted physicians, as FOPA does, destroys patient trust 
by increasing risk of governmental coercion.254 By replacing 
physicians’ medical judgment with state-mandated silence, FOPA 
 
 247. Berg, supra note 2, at 247.  
 248. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 253–54 (4th Cir. 2014).  
 249. Hethcoat II, supra note 28, at 33.  
 250. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 892 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Thomas 
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring)); see also Halberstam, supra note 7, 
at 845 (referencing the imbalance of authority in the physician–patient relationship).  
 251. Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 889; see also Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 247 (justifying the 
potential state regulatory authority over physician speech on the State’s “regulation . . . [that] 
‘provide[s] clients with the confidence they require to put their health or their livelihood in the 
hands’” of a physician (quoting King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014))).  
 252. Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 892 (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 545 (Jackson, J., 
concurring)).  
 253. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring). In fact, Justice Jackson would likely 
reject the majority’s assertion that the government possesses a strong interest in regulating 
physician speech. See id. (“Likewise, the state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an 
occupation without its license but I do not think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to 
speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical thought.” (emphasis added)).  
 254. Berg, supra note 2, at 230–31.  
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undermines the trust of the physician–patient relationship. In fact, 
this damage is “magnified when the physician is compelled to deliver 
the state’s preferred message in his or her own voice.”255 Patients do 
not know whether their physician is speaking, or the state.256 Likewise, 
when states prohibit physician speech, patients do not know whether 
their physicians’ silence is based on medical conclusions or the state’s 
mandated preferences. This information imbalance empowers the 
state to endorse partisan views by restraining the availability of 
targeted information and deceiving the patient’s decisionmaking 
process.257 
Distinguishing between compelled physician speech and 
prohibited physician speech only serves to highlight the flaws in the 
majority’s rationale. When the state compels speech, the flow of 
information is uninhibited. Nonetheless, as in Camnitz, the patient 
has the ability to ignore any communication.258 Conversely, when the 
state prohibits certain speech, patients have no sufficiently reliable 
alternative avenue to obtain that information. They cannot simply 
ignore the undesired speech. It “is never open to contemplation, 
investigation, or to being discounted or rejected.”259 This is 
exponentially more disconcerting for medical patients—potentially 
critical information is off the table for consideration, and patients are 
restrained from choosing what is in their best interest.260 Allowing the 
 
 255. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 253.  
 256. Consider again the North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act, which compels 
physicians to provide specific information and take certain steps before conducting an abortion. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90–21.85(a) (2011); see also supra notes 226–34 (describing the Act’s 
requirements in greater detail). Patients are left in the dark as to the source of this information, 
particularly, whether the state prescribed it, or whether their physician did.  
 257. Berg, supra note 2, at 231.  
 258. See Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 252 (discussing implications in North Carolina for 
implementing a statute that requires women to forcefully ignore physician communication). In 
fact, North Carolina explicitly recognized this point while codifying the Woman’s Right to 
Know Act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90–21.85(b) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
prevent a pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the displayed images or from refusing to 
hear the simultaneous explanation and medical description.”).  
 259. Janet L. Dolgin, Physician Speech and State Control: Furthering Partisan Interests at the 
Expense of Good Health, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 293, 338 (2014); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 
U.S. 726, 775 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing the inherent fears when “[b]oth those 
desiring to receive [a] message . . . and those wishing to send it to them are prevented from 
doing so”). In fact, the Wollschlaeger majority acknowledged “society’s interest in the free flow 
of information.” Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 890 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Va. State Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1975)).  
 260. Cf. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 478–79 
(2011) (discussing the marketplace of ideas as a rationale for First Amendment protection). It is 
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state to restrict physician speech under the guise of protecting 
patients undermines any trust in their physician, and thus, only serves 
to harm patients more.261 
Second, even commercial speech has enjoyed First Amendment 
coverage for roughly forty years.262 This coverage is rationalized by 
the desire to shelter “the free flow of commercial communication in 
the marketplace.”263 Thus, the First Amendment weighs the 
government’s interest in regulating the commercial speaker against 
the recipient’s need or desire for the information.264 The First 
Amendment covers commercial speech when the speech is not false, 
misleading, or does not involve unlawful activity.265 This is because 
misleading speech subverts the rationale for protecting commercial 
speech under the First Amendment—“the informational function of 
advertising.”266 
Physician speech deserves First Amendment coverage for many 
of the same reasons that commercial speech enjoys such coverage. 
Placing commercial speech behind the First Amendment’s protective 
shield implicates the widely accepted argument that citizens possess a 
right to accrue “knowledge and thereby retain control over one’s own 
thought processes.”267 Regulatory schemes that restrict physicians’ 
 
true that states may attempt to censor harmful information by restricting physician speech. The 
First Amendment, however, should still cover this type of restriction; the distinguishing analysis 
would occur in protection. For a discussion of First Amendment protection, see infra notes 287–
303 and accompanying text.  
 261. See Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communication and the First Amendment After 
Sorrell, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 101, 114 (2012) (describing the harm that stems from 
depriving patients of necessary medical information).  
 262. Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“We are equally clear that 
the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial 
advertising.”), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee 501 U.S. 808 (1991), with Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (protecting commercial speech so that the state may not “keep[] the 
public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering”).  
 263. Alison L. Stohr, Comment, Valor for Sale: Applying the Commercial Speech Exception 
to Self-Promoting Individuals, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 455, 465 (2013).  
 264. See id. at 463 (justifying protection of commercial speech by analyzing the expression’s 
nature in accordance with the governmental interest served in regulating that expression); see 
also ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 42–43 (2012) (explaining that the 
Constitution generally protects the speaker’s expression, but lower levels of protection for 
commercial speech are rationalized by the decision to concentrate on safeguarding the listener).  
 265. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980).  
 266. Id. at 563 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).  
 267. Berg, supra note 2, at 245 (citations omitted); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 482 (1965) (“[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, 
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ability to speak with their patients, even under the guise of protecting 
patients, inhibit this right. Patients are constricted in their ability to 
amass critical medical information. Additionally, commercial speech 
by its very nature is motivated by pecuniary gain and may not be in 
the recipient’s best interest. But physicians are not primarily 
motivated by their own financial gain. Their duty268 is to provide the 
medical care that is in their patients’ best interest. The result is a 
quasi-regulated profession that mandates only certain speech as 
appropriate. If self-interested, fiscally driven speech receives First 
Amendment coverage, patient-interested physician speech should as 
well.269 
2. Building a Test—When Physician Speech Should be Covered 
by the First Amendment.  Physician speech should receive First 
Amendment coverage when (1) the speech is rendered within the 
scope of the doctor–patient relationship, and (2) the information 
given or requested is truthful and nonmisleading. First, physician 
speech should only enjoy First Amendment coverage when the trust 
of the physician–patient relationship is intact. Without trust, the 
foundation of the physician–patient relationship is absent.270 As no 
“personal nexus”271 exists between physician and patient, the state 
lacks the supervisory capability to regulate the medical field.272 
 
contract the spectrum of available knowledge.”); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 
1255 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Our review of the Supreme Court’s decisions confirms that the First 
Amendment does not merely prohibit the government from enacting laws that censor 
information, but additionally encompasses the positive right of public access to information and 
ideas.”); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 
(asserting that the “right to know” should be considered as integral to the freedom of speech 
and expression under the First Amendment).  
 268. For a discussion of the physician’s duties to the patient, see infra notes 275–78 and 
accompanying text.  
 269. This is even more so the case when the speech is accurate and nonmisleading. See 
Amarin Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, No. 15-cv-3588 (PAE), 2015 WL 4720039, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
7, 2015) (choosing to rule “in favor of giving doctors more, not less, information” in a 
commercial speech setting). 
 270. See Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating End-of-Life 
Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Physician-Patient Relationships, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1091, 
1100 (1999) (“[T]rust is essential to the way medical treatment decisions are made . . . . [It] is 
essential to the ethical foundation of the physician-patient relationship.”). For a discussion of 
the importance of trust in the physician–patient relationship, see supra notes 238–61 and 
accompanying text.  
 271. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring). 
 272. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[O]utside the doctor-
patient relationship, doctors are constitutionally equivalent to soapbox orators and 
pamphleteers, and their speech receives robust protection under the First Amendment.”).   
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Without a trustful physician–patient relationship, the physician’s 
speech transforms to “speech by a physician.”273 Consequently, the 
physician-speech doctrine would be inapplicable.274 
A strong gauge for testing whether the trust of the physician–
patient relationship is established is analyzing whether the physician 
has a duty of faith, trust, and confidence to the patient.275 Numerous 
courts agree that “physicians owe a fiduciary obligation to their 
patients, stemming from the intrinsic nature of the physician-patient 
relationship.”276 Because the physician is obligated to act in the 
patient’s best interests,277 the state need not implement regulatory 
schemes to police improper medical practices. When physician speech 
is not in furtherance of their physician duties,278 however, it does not 
fall within the scope of the physician–patient relationship. 
Consequently, the trust inherent in the physician–patient relationship 
is absent, and the speech cannot be considered physician speech for 
First Amendment coverage purposes. 
 
 273. To clarify this analysis, it is helpful to make a nuanced distinction—the difference 
between “physician speech” and “speech by a physician.” On one hand, physician speech is 
generally understood as speech “uttered in the course of professional practice.” Halberstam, 
supra note 7, at 843. On the other hand, speech by a physician is precisely that: “speech . . . 
uttered by a professional.” Id. This distinction is critical; the state has no authority to restrict 
speech solely because a physician uttered the statement. Suppose a physician asks a long-time 
patient how his or her family’s recent vacation was. Or whether his or her child is engaged yet. 
The state is unable to restrict this kind of speech; it is the archetypal “speech by a physician.”  
 274. See Post, supra note 8, at 952 (explaining that not all speech during the practice of 
medicine qualifies as “professional speech”). One example given by Professor Robert Post is if a 
physician trips while examining a patient. Id. Any shouts of pain, even those occurring whilst 
examining a patient, are not “professional speech.” Id. 
 275. Cf. Fiduciary Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a fiduciary 
duty as “[a] duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary . . . to 
the beneficiary . . . ; a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty toward another 
person and in the best interests of the other person”).  
 276. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of 
Physicians to “Just Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services That Are Not Medically 
Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 369 (2009) (listing cases that recognize the fiduciary 
nature of the physician–patient relationship).  
 277. See Ison v. McFall, 400 S.W.2d 243, 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that physicians 
owe a fiduciary relationship to their patients, and, as such, must advise their patients if they plan 
to use any medical treatment that will not be beneficial).  
 278. In the medical field, the duty owed is to act in the patient’s best interests. For a 
discussion of “the physician’s fiduciary duty to act in the patient’s best interest,” see Swartz, 
supra note 261, at 122.  
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Suppose that a patient is a personal friend of his physician.279 
During the course of the examination, the physician asks whether his 
friend would like to go hunting or skeet shooting with him. This 
inquiry is undoubtedly irrelevant to the patient’s medical interests, 
and thus beyond the scope of the fiduciary obligations of the 
physician–patient relationship. No “personal nexus” exists in which 
the physician “purport[s] to be exercising judgment on behalf” of the 
patient.280 The physician is speaking as an ordinary citizen.281 As such, 
this speech would not be covered as physician speech for First 
Amendment purposes.282  
Second, as in commercial speech, physician speech should only 
receive First Amendment coverage when the information conveyed is 
truthful and nonmisleading. As previously discussed, commercial 
speech receives First Amendment coverage to ensure the necessary 
free flow of communication.283 In order to guarantee the circulation of 
accurate information,284 that speech must be truthful and 
nonmisleading.285 Likewise, as trust is the physician–patient 
relationship’s central component,286 then physician speech should only 
be protected when the conveyed information is accurate. Without 
requiring that the information conveyed be truthful and 
nonmisleading, any trust between the physician and the patient would 
 
 279. This example is adopted from one given by Judge Wilson. See Wollschlaeger v. 
Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1250 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 280. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring). 
 281. See supra note 273 (distinguishing between physician speech and speech by a 
physician). The Wollschlaeger majority considers this speech “to a client, on a matter irrelative 
to the practice of medicine.” Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 797 F.3d 859, 888 (11th Cir. 
2015). 
 282. This speech may be covered, however, as “citizen speech.” See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. 
Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014) (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)) (recognizing that 
citizen speech triggers First Amendment protection); see also supra note 273 (drawing a 
distinction between physician speech and speech by a physician). 
 283. For a discussion of the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech, see supra 
notes 262–64 and accompanying text. In fact, misleading information is generally understood to 
fall beyond the ambit of First Amendment protection. See Schauer, supra note 108, at 1802 
(noting that regulation of misleading information “is generally (and silently) understood not to 
raise First Amendment issues”).  
 284. See Post, supra note 8, at 978 (justifying the protection of commercial speech due to the 
accuracy of information). 
 285. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980) (identifying whether speech concerns lawful activity or misleading information as the 
first step in a four-part commercial speech analysis).  
 286. See supra notes 238–61, 270, 276–78 and accompanying text (discussing the importance 
of trust).  
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be significantly damaged. The patient would have no assurance that 
the physician’s treatment was potentially effective. Consequently, the 
physician–patient relationship would be ineffective and patients 
would be far less willing to disclose sensitive information. 
III.  THE PERMISSIBLE REGULATION OF FREE PHYSICIAN SPEECH 
Not all speech is treated equally—certain speech does not 
receive any First Amendment coverage.287 But the First Amendment 
also distinguishes between various categories of covered speech.288 
Thus, once the First Amendment’s protective facilities are triggered, 
a second question must be answered: How much security does the 
speech at issue receive?289 This concept is framed as an inquiry into 
“protection.”290 Certain speech is more deserving of protection, and 
thus more elusive of governmental restraint.291 Having shown that the 
First Amendment cannot be avoided, Section A demonstrates why 
intermediate scrutiny should be the appropriate standard for 
physician speech. Section B explains why FOPA does not pass 
constitutional muster. 
 
 287. For a discussion of the First Amendment’s coverage, see supra Part II.  
 288. See Schauer, supra note 108, at 1770 ( “[T]he First Amendment makes a difference in 
the categories that it covers even when the particular speech that is a member of some covered 
category winds up unprotected.”).  
 289. See id. at 1769 (“When the First Amendment does show up, the full arsenal of First 
Amendment rules, principles, standards, distinctions, presumptions, tools, factors, and three-
part tests becomes available to determine whether the particular speech will actually wind up 
being protected.”).  
 290. Id. 
 291. Compare Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 635 (1994) (deciding that 
intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard for content-neutral regulations), with City of L.A. 
v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 
481 U.S. 221, 230–31 (1987)) (observing that content-based regulations are analyzed under strict 
scrutiny).  
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A. Choosing The Level of Protection—Intermediate Scrutiny292 
As a template for physician-speech protection, it is helpful to 
consider the level of protection provided to similar types of speech. 
Commercial speech is a compelling analogue. Although commercial 
speech receives less protection than noncommercial speech,293 it does 
not lack protection altogether.294 This is due to the “‘commonsense 
distinction’ between speech proposing a commercial transaction, 
which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government 
regulation, and other varieties of speech.”295 Commercial speech that 
receives First Amendment protection296 is generally subject to 
intermediate scrutiny.297 
Commercial speech and physician speech share significant 
characteristics justifying their comparison. First, both physician 
speech and commercial speech are beneficial to listeners due to the 
“informational function”298 served.299 Physicians impart specialized 
knowledge that laypersons have little or no familiarity with. Although 
the relevant information may be exposed in alternative manners, it 
will often be disclosed only through a licensed physician. Second, 
 
 292. Although the revised Wollschlaeger majority opinion subjected FOPA to intermediate 
scrutiny, its two-dimensional approach left open the possibility that physician speech may be 
subject to a lesser level of scrutiny. In deciding what level of scrutiny to apply, the majority 
recognized that “when a professional speaks to the public in a nonprofessional capacity, courts 
apply the most exacting scrutiny.” Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 892 (11th 
Cir. 2015). But the majority conceived of physician speech as “a context in which the State’s 
interest in regulating for the protection of the public is more deeply rooted.” Id. Consequently, 
although the majority left “the question open, it declare[d] that [physician speech] may actually 
be subject to a level of scrutiny more deferential than intermediate scrutiny.” Id. at 909 (Wilson, 
J., dissenting).  
 293. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (explaining that courts 
apply “a less than strict, ‘intermediate’ First Amendment test when the government directly 
restricts commercial speech”).  
 294. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (clarifying that the 
commercial speech test is “significantly stricter than the rational basis test”).  
 295. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 
(1980) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).  
 296. For a discussion of First Amendment coverage of commercial speech, see supra notes 
262–66 and accompanying text.  
 297. See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(concluding that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate test for commercial speech).   
 298. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
783 (1978)).  
 299. See Post, supra note 8, at 979 (referencing “the right of the patient to receive 
information”); see also supra note 263 and accompanying text (mentioning the informative 
value of commercial speech). 
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both types of speech occur in areas that are traditionally exposed to 
government regulation.300 States have long regulated physicians to 
protect prospective patients and increase the overall quality of 
healthcare.301 
Given these salient similarities, physician speech should receive 
the same degree of First Amendment protection302 as commercial 
speech—intermediate scrutiny.303 Thus, the government must first 
establish a “substantial” interest in regulating the physician speech in 
question.304 Second, the government must demonstrate that the 
regulation “directly advances the [asserted] governmental interest.”305 
Finally, the government must show that the regulation “is not more 
extensive than . . . necessary to serve that interest.”306 
B. FOPA’s Constitutional Pitfalls 
The Eleventh Circuit’s holding—based on the unfounded 
conclusion that restricting physician speech will protect patient 
privacy and health307—reduced physician advice to second-class 
 
 300. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (explaining that commercial speech “occurs in an 
area traditionally subject to government regulation” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 
436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978))); see also supra Part I.C (documenting the history of medical field 
regulations through licensing schemes and protective measures).  
 301. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 
129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889)) (noting the extensive history surrounding medical regulations).  
 302. To be sure, traditional First Amendment doctrines apply to physician speech, and 
should continue to do so. For example, content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on 
speech receive strict scrutiny. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“[C]ontent- or viewpoint-based regulation[s] . . . must be closely scrutinized.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Indeed, even content-based 
restrictions on speech are ‘presumptively invalid.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
382 (1992))).  
 303. Some scholars argue against a lower level of protection for commercial speech. See, 
e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 
652–53 (1990) (arguing that commercial speech may be equally as important as noncommercial 
speech, and thus, deserves more protection that currently provided). This Note does not argue 
that physician speech definitively deserves intermediate scrutiny. Rather, it posits a symmetry 
argument: physician speech should enjoy whatever protection commercial speech enjoys (which, 
as of this Note’s completion, is intermediate scrutiny). Thus, if the Supreme Court later holds 
that commercial speech deserves strict scrutiny, physician speech should as well.  
 304. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (applying the intermediate scrutiny test in a 
commercial speech case).  
 305. Id.  
 306. Id.  
 307. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 883 (11th Cir. 2015) (rationalizing that 
FOPA merely explains what is “within the boundaries of good medical practice”).  
WEISS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/2015  10:34 AM 
2016] REMOVING THE “SILENCER” 837 
speech.308 Instead of protecting patients, restricting physician speech 
cements a significant barrier to complete medical care and ignores 
recommendations by established medical organizations.309 Physicians 
must engage in a full discussion with their patients to give precise 
medical advice. Additionally, patients must receive complete 
information to reach an informed and autonomous choice in their 
medical care. Restricting such important speech imposes “an 
undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket”310 on physicians and their 
patients. 
Under intermediate scrutiny, FOPA must directly advance the 
government’s interest in protecting patient privacy.311 It is doubtful, 
however, that any legislative action is necessary to further that 
interest.312 To the extent that privacy reinforces the permissibility of 
any state regulation restricting physician speech, current federal 
regulations alleviate that need. One such regulation, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),313 unambiguously 
ensures a patient’s privacy regarding firearm usage. PPACA prohibits 
healthcare practitioners from divulging any information concerning 
“the lawful ownership or possession of a firearm or ammunition,”314 or 
“the lawful use, possession, or storage of a firearm or ammunition.”315 
Likewise, the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA),316 safeguards the privacy of information that patients 
 
 308. See id. at 909 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (recognizing that even commercial speech is 
subject to intermediate scrutiny).  
 309. See supra note 29 (documenting the recommendations of the American Academy of 
Pediatrics and the American Medical Association).  
 310. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976).  
 311. Normally, the preliminary question is whether the government interest qualifies as 
“substantial.” However, Florida concededly has a substantial interest in “promoting the health, 
safety, and welfare of its citizens.” Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (citing 
Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)).   
 312. Florida asserted that FOPA protects the government’s interest in safeguarding 
patients’ privacy. See Brief for Appellants at 32, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 
1195 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-14009) (“[FOPA] serves a number of substantial governmental 
interests, including . . . the protection of privacy rights . . . .”).  
 313. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 314. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17(c)(5)(A) (2012). 
 315. Id. § 300gg-17(c)(5)(B).  
 316. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).  
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disclose to physicians.317 HIPAA also regulates to what extent 
healthcare practitioners may disclose their patients’ personal “health 
information.”318 Florida’s analogue, for example, dictates that 
healthcare practitioners may not provide a patient’s medical record to 
a third party without that patient’s permission.319 Thus, FOPA 
burdens more speech than is necessary; HIPAA “already prohibits 
and penalizes”320 improper plunges into patients’ private matters.321 
FOPA’s proponents may argue that the privacy interest at stake 
is not the divulging of firearm ownership information, but the inquiry 
into firearm ownership itself. Thus, so the argument goes, the only 
way to safeguard a patient’s privacy is by restricting the inquiry in the 
first place.322 But this argument is flawed in three regards. First, 
information related to firearm ownership is not venerated.323 In fact, 
federal and state statutes require that certain firearm-ownership 
information be divulged.324 Second, there is no evidence that patient 
privacy is in danger, and therefore, that any protection is 
unnecessary.325 Third, the asserted privacy interests “are a mere 
 
 317. In some jurisdictions privacy exceptions can diminish HIPAA’s ability to shelter certain 
information. See generally Stephanie E. Pearl, Note, HIPAA: Caught in the Cross Fire, 64 DUKE 
L.J. 559 (2014) (discussing the HIPAA Privacy Rule).  
 318. “Health Information” is defined as “any information . . . that: (1) Is created or received 
by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or 
university, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical 
or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or 
the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual.” 45 C.F.R. 
§ 160.103 (2014).  
 319. See FLA. STAT. § 456.057(7)(a) (2014) (mandating that physicians may not furnish or 
discuss a patient’s medical records with “any person other than the patient or the patient’s legal 
representative or other health care practitioners and providers involved in the care or treatment 
of the patient, except upon written authorization of the patient”).  
 320. STAFF OF H.R. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUBCOMM., 113TH SESS., BILL ANALYSIS AND 
FISCAL STATEMENT FOR H.R. 155, at 5 (Comm. Print. 2011). 
 321. Cf. Alex L. Bednar, HIPAA Implications for Attorney-Client Privilege, 35 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 871, 875 (2004) (emphasizing that HIPAA “serves to enhance trust between patients and 
health care providers”).  
 322. The Wollschlaeger majority agreed with this argument, noting that “[t]he principal 
harm targeted by [FOPA] is the collection of information regarding . . . firearm ownership.” 
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 898–99 (11th Cir. 2015).  
 323. Cf. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 585 (2000) (holding that an alleged 
government interest in protecting voter affiliation was not compelling and noting that the 
information is not venerated).  
 324. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 923 (2012) (requiring certain information to be provided when a 
firearm transfers ownership); FLA. STAT. § 790 (regulating the possession of firearms). 
 325. See Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1266 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (explaining 
that Florida could not “show that any real [privacy] barriers actually exist or are widespread and 
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pretext for the State’s suppression of speech with which it 
disagrees.”326 Consequently, any reliance on the patient’s privacy 
interest is misplaced. 
Moreover, under intermediate scrutiny a statute may not 
regulate more extensively than necessary to serve its asserted interest. 
But FOPA drastically burdens and undermines legislative policy 
choices. Florida, like many states, maintains child access prevention 
statutes.327 These statutes “impose criminal liability on adults who 
negligently or recklessly leave firearms accessible to minors or 
otherwise allow minors access to firearms.”328 Statistics help to explain 
the legislative rationale underlying this type of law—firearms in the 
home are forty-three times more likely to kill a family member than 
an intruder.329 Additionally, deaths by firearms in the home are 
commonly the result of an accident,330 homicide,331 or suicide.332 These 
statistical findings support the conclusion that physicians should be 
encouraged—not restricted—to exercise broad discretion to inquire 
into their patients’ ownership, use, and possession of firearms. 
Allowing physicians to discuss firearm ownership, use, and possession 
with their patients would thus help reinforce Florida’s chosen policy 
through the provision of information to those at whom the policy is 
aimed. Instead, FOPA precludes an opportunity for physicians to 
help effectuate this policy. 
 
pervasive”). In fact, nothing would stop a physician from inquiring into other private matters—
for example, whether a patient is sexually active or uses contraceptive devices.  
 326. Calvert et al., supra note 24, at 43; see also Eugene Volokh, Court Upholds Florida Law 
Restricting Doctor-Patient Speech About Guns, WASH. POST (July 29, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/29/court-upholds-restriction-on-
doctor-patient-speech-about-guns [http://www.perma.cc/RC9M-CKXC] (explaining that FOPA 
is “about preventing doctors from spreading what many gun rights supporters see as unsound 
anti-gun propaganda”).  
 327. See Erin P. Lynch, Comment, Federal Gun Storage Legislation: Will This Keep Guns 
Out of the Hands of Our Children?, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 211, 220 (1999) 
(discussing the history of child-access-prevention statutes). In fact, Florida was the first state to 
enact such a statute. Id.; see 1989 Fla. Laws 2739, 2739–42 (codifying, in Senate Bill 18-B, 
Florida’s regulation regarding the safe storage of firearms). 
 328. Hethcoat II, supra note 28, at 31.  
 329. Brian Falls, Legislation Prohibiting Physicians from Asking Patients About Guns, 39 J. 
PSYCHOL. & L. 441, 446 (2011).  
 330. See id. at 447 (noting that accidents cause most domestic child firearm deaths).  
 331. See id. (illustrating that 41 percent of “gun-related homicides would not occur without 
access to guns in the home”).  
 332. See id. (“Gunshots are by far the most lethal method of suicide attempts; up to 96% 
result in death, whereas overdose is lethal in about 2–7% of cases.”).  
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Additionally, the patient’s right to refuse to answer diminishes 
the efficacy of the inquiry and record-keeping provisions. Under 
§ 790.338(4) of the Florida Statutes, patients have the right to 
“decline to answer or provide any information regarding ownership 
of a firearm”333 without fear of physician retaliation.334 Consequently, 
patients are capable of protecting their own privacy beyond any 
assistance from the State’s inquiry and record-keeping protections. 
Since these two provisions are functionally irrelevant after 
considering § 790.338(4), FOPA burdens more speech than necessary 
to further Florida’s substantial government interest in protecting 
privacy. 
Similarly, FOPA burdens more speech than necessary by 
banning all inquiries related to the possession of firearms instead of 
tailoring the prohibition to only those who object. Undoubtedly, 
some patients appreciate inquiries regarding firearm ownership, use, 
and possession as part of their preventative care. Florida could 
provide those patients their desired care by implementing a carve-out 
provision that allows welcomed inquiries.335 But FOPA does not 
include an exception that allows a patient to consent to the inquiry. 
Rather, it silences all inquiries into firearm ownership, use, and 
possession—even those that are requested. By doing so, FOPA 
burdens far more speech than is needed to further its substantial state 
interest. 
Finally, there is seemingly no reason why Florida could not enact 
a regulation that would punish physicians after a case-by-case analysis 
of whether the physician impermissibly plunged into a patient’s 
private matters. Instead of targeting and banning one specific topic, 
this regulatory scheme would allow consideration of additional 
factors, for instance: whether other medical associations recommend 
the questioning, the patient’s need for specific treatment, or the 
previous relationship between the patient and physician. Although 
the legality of most questioning under FOPA assumedly would not 
 
 333. FLA. STAT. § 790.338(4) (2014). 
 334. See id. (“A patient’s decision not to answer a question relating to the presence or 
ownership of a firearm does not alter existing law regarding a physician’s authorization to 
choose his or her patients.”).  
 335. See Burk v. Augusta-Richmond Cty., 365 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004) (observing 
that the county in that case “could, for example, target only offensive behavior or the manner of 
delivery of speech without regard to viewpoint or subject matter,” rather than enacting an 
unconstitutionally burdensome ordinance regulating protests in public places).  
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change,336 the chilling effect337 on questioning would.338 Accordingly, 
physicians would likely be more inclined to “express[] their views and 
provid[e] information to patients”339 about any appropriate topic. 
CONCLUSION 
As Judge Wilson sensibly posited in Wollschlaeger v. Governor 
of Florida, “doctors have a First Amendment right to convey [a] 
message.”340 Although the police power of the states certainly permits 
broad regulation of the medical field, this capability should not be 
interpreted to authorize an override of the imperative protective 
facilities provided by the First Amendment. Even when acting as 
professionals, citizens retain their First Amendment rights. Thus, as 
applied to physicians, courts and legislatures should not ignore Justice 
Douglas’s reminder that “[t]he right of the doctor to advise his 
patients according to his best lights seems so obviously within First 
Amendment rights as to need no extended discussion.”341 
Framing First Amendment coverage of physician speech around 
the government’s supposed interest in protecting patients’ privacy 
rights erodes the foundation of trust upon which the physician–
patient relationship rests. Patients seek medical care because they 
lack, and are thus seeking, knowledge that is critical to their health. 
When states restrict specific physician speech, however, they mislead 
patients’ decisionmaking process and lessen trust in the physician. 
While states may assert that they are acting in the patients’ best 
interest by ensuring proper care, this argument ignores the fact that 
physicians are already obligated to act in their patients’ best interest. 
Furthermore, when states prohibit physician speech, patients have no 
sufficiently reliable alternative avenue by which to acquire that 
information. Thus, physician speech should presumptively enjoy 
coverage of the First Amendment’s protective shield so long as the 
 
 336. FOPA allows questioning when relevant. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (creating an 
exception for relevant questioning). Under the proffered patient privacy regulation, anything 
beyond the realm of relevancy would likely be considered an impermissible line of questioning.   
 337. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859, 906 (11th Cir. 2015) (Wilson, J., 
dissenting) (explaining FOPA’s chilling effect).  
 338. See David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1367–68 (2005) 
(arguing that any chilling effect is greatly weakened when the state does not target specific 
speech).  
 339. Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 902 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 340. Id. 
 341. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
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speech at issue is (1) rendered in a trusting, physician–patient 
relationship, and (2) the information given or requested is truthful 
and nonmisleading. 
But providing First Amendment coverage does not strip the state 
of its regulatory powers. By contrast, the state can restrict physician 
speech so long as the regulation passes constitutional muster. Given 
the prominent similarities between commercial speech and physician 
speech, the two should receive the same degree of First Amendment 
protection—intermediate scrutiny. And FOPA meets its demise at 
intermediate scrutiny. Restricting integral physician speech on one 
specific topic imposes a mountainous barrier to medical care. 
Furthermore, supplementary federal regulations achieve the same 
interest allegedly furthered by FOPA—protecting patient privacy. 
Consequently, FOPA fails to directly advance any substantial 
government interest without burdening more speech than necessary. 
Only time will tell how courts and state legislatures will react to 
the Wollschlaeger decision. Assumedly, other states may believe that 
they now have a “green light” to restrict physician speech through 
FOPA-like statutory regimes. That decision, however, would be a 
terrible mistake. It destroys the trust of the physician–patient 
relationship and relegates it to obscurity. 
 
